# belief_update_in_the_horn_fragment__f6281610.pdf Belief Update in the Horn Fragment Nadia Creignou1, Adrian Haret2, Odile Papini1, Stefan Woltran2 1 Aix Marseille Universit e, Universit e de Toulon, CNRS, LIS, Marseille, France 2 TU Wien, Institute of Logic and Computation 192-02, TU Wien, Vienna, Austria nadia.creignou@univ-amu.fr, haret@dbai.tuwien.ac.at, odile.papini@univ-amu.fr, woltran@dbai.tuwien.ac.at In line with recent work on belief change in fragments of propositional logic, we study belief update in the Horn fragment. We start from the standard KM postulates used to axiomatize belief update operators; these postulates lend themselves to semantic characterizations in terms of partial (resp. total) preorders on possible worlds. Since the Horn fragment is not closed under disjunction, the standard postulates have to be adapted for the Horn fragment. Moreover, a restriction on the preorders (i.e., Horn compliance) and additional postulates are needed to obtain sensible characterizations for the Horn fragment, and this leads to our main contribution: a representation result which shows that the class of update operators captured by Horn compliant partial (resp. total) preorders over possible worlds is precisely that given by the adapted and augmented Horn update postulates. With these results at hand, we provide concrete Horn update operators and are able to shed light on Horn revision operators based on partial preorders. 1 Introduction The aim of an update operator is to incorporate new information into an agent s beliefs, reflecting a change in her environment. Originally developed for use with deductive databases [Fagin et al., 1983], links between update and other members of the belief change family soon emerged [Keller and Winslett, 1985]. Interest in distinctions between update and revision led to a unified treatment of both operations using logical postulates and representations using preorders on possible worlds [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992b]. Intuitively, revision is triggered by new information about a static environment, while update occurs in a changing environment. From a logical point of view, when the agent s beliefs are represented by a logical formula ψ, revision makes the models of ψ evolve as a whole towards the closest models of the new information µ. In contrast, update makes each model of ψ locally evolve towards the closest models of µ. Recently, concern about practical aspects related to belief change has prompted research on belief change in languages weaker than propositional logic, also known as fragments, a particularly vivid topic of interest being the Horn fragment of propositional logic. Interest in the Horn fragment arises from the facts that (i) certain important reasoning tasks (e.g., deciding satisfiability of a Horn formula) are tractable in Horn logic, and (ii) it is a widely used restriction on the language, relevant for fields like logic programming, databases and description logics. Thus, an understanding of belief change in the Horn fragment could serve as a prototype for semantic approaches to change in these fields, a topic which has, as of late, met with increased attention [Kharlamov et al., 2013; Delgrande et al., 2013; Zhuang et al., 2016]. Research on belief change in the Horn fragment has looked at contraction [Booth et al., 2011; Delgrande and Wassermann, 2013; Zhuang and Pagnucco, 2014], revision [Delgrande and Peppas, 2015; Zhuang et al., 2017] and merging [Haret et al., 2017], often with an eye towards finding appropriate postulates and deriving representation results. There is a distinct lack, however, of foundational research on update in the Horn fragment. Our work is meant to fill this gap. Similarly to previous research, we find that existing results on update do not generalize in a straightforward way when the underlying language is restricted. Firstly, special care must be taken when stating postulates, as the limited expressibility of the Horn fragment makes formulation of familiar intuitions either cumbersome or impossible: since the Horn fragment is not closed under disjunction, certain key postulates must be weakened, but this then results in the possibility that Horn operators are represented by undesirable types of preorders on possible worlds. This difficulty is reminiscent of problems encountered when characterizing Horn revision using total preorders [Delgrande and Peppas, 2015]. However, since our aim is to capture Horn update operators characterizable with partial (as well as total) preorders, these problems are compounded and require new ideas. We handle this issue by adding new postulates whose effect is felt in the Horn fragment, but which follow from the standard postulates in propositional logic. Secondly, it is natural to expect that update operators working on Horn formulas should return a result that can also be represented by a Horn formula. This is a minimal requirement if, e.g., update is to be applied in an iterated way. However, it turns out that standard operators proposed in the literature (e.g., Forbus and Winslett s operators) do not meet it and a special restriction, called Horn compliance, must be placed Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-18) on any acceptable operator. Finally, we provide concrete Horn update operators that build on these results. In addition, we exploit insights gained in characterizing Horn update operators with partial preorders, and apply them to get representation results for Horn revision operators characterized with partial preorders. In summary, our main contributions are as follows: we provide postulates for Horn update, we study the relation between operators satisfying the postulates and operators given by total (respectively, partial) preorders on interpretations, we find that additional postulates (UH A and UH A ) and a restriction on the preorders (Horn compliance) are needed in order to obtain a representation theorem, we provide concrete Horn update operators, and we obtain a representation result for Horn revision in terms of partial preorders. 2 Preliminaries We use finite set P of propositional atoms, and L the set of propositional formulas formed over L using the usual propositional connectives. The set of all interpretations for formulas in L is W. An interpretation over P is represented by a set of atoms (corresponding to the variables set to true). For the sake of readability, e.g. the following set of interpretations, {{a, b}, {b, c}}, is written as {ab, bc}. If µ is a propositional formula, then [µ] is the set of models of µ. Given two formulas ψ and ϕ, ψ |= ϕ if [ψ] [ϕ]. A formula ψ is complete if for any formula ϕ we have ψ |= ϕ or ψ |= ϕ. Equivalently, a satisfiable formula ψ is complete if it has exactly one model. A literal is an atom or its negation. A clause is a disjunction of literals. A clause is called Horn if at most one of its literals is positive. A Horn formula is a conjunction of Horn clauses. We denote by LHorn the set of Horn formulas. Horn formulas have the property that their sets of models are closed under intersection, i.e., for any ϕ LHorn, if w1 and w2 are both models of ϕ, then so is w1 w2. Furtherome, this property characterizes the Horn fragment: given a set of interpretations M closed under intersection, i.e., such that for all w1 M and w2 M, also w1 w2 M, there exists a formula ϕ LHorn such that [ϕ] = M. Given M W we denote by Cl H(M) its closure under intersection. For any M W there exists a Horn formula ϕM such that [ϕM] = Cl H(M). A preorder on a set M is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on M. We write < for the strict part of . The minimal elements of M with respect to a preorder are min M = {x M | x M such that x < x}. 3 Belief Update Formally, a propositional update operator is a function : L L L, mapping a propositional formula ψ (the initial agent s beliefs) and a propositional formula µ (new information) to a new propositional formula ψ µ (the updated agent s beliefs). For ψ, ψ1, ψ2, µ, µ1, µ2 L, we recall the KM postulates [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992a], intended to capture rational properties any update operator should satisfy: (U1) ψ µ |= µ. (U2) If ψ |= µ, then ψ µ ψ. (U3) If ψ and µ are satisfiable, then ψ µ is satisfiable. (U4) If ψ1 ψ2 and µ1 µ2, then ψ1 µ1 ψ2 µ2. (U5) (ψ µ1) µ2 |= ψ (µ1 µ2). (U6) If ψ µ1 |= µ2 and ψ µ2 |= µ1, then ψ µ1 ψ µ2 (U7) If ψ is complete, then (ψ µ1) (ψ µ2) |= ψ (µ1 µ2). (U8) (ψ1 ψ2) µ (ψ1 µ) (ψ2 µ). (U9) If ψ is complete and (ψ µ1) µ2 is satisfiable, then ψ (µ1 µ2) |= (ψ µ1) µ2. Postulate U1 states that models of the updated beliefs have to be models of new information; U2 states that if µ was a consequence of ψ before update, then the agent s beliefs do not change after update, i.e., inertia is preferred to spontaneous evolution; U3 states that if the original beliefs and the new information are consistent, then update can always be performed; U4 enforces irrelevance of syntax; U5 expresses minimality of change. Postulate U6 says that if updating ψ by µ1 guarantees µ2 and updating ψ by µ2 guarantees µ1 then the two updates have the same effect. Postulate U7 says that when ψ is complete, a model of ψ updated by µ1 and of ψ updated by µ2 must be a model of ψ updated by µ1 µ2. Postulate U8 states that an update operator gives each model of the initial beliefs equal consideration. Finally, postulate U9 is the converse of U5, restricted to complete formulas ψ. Note, finally, that postulate U9 implies U6 7, and thus the set U1 9 can be said to be stronger than U1 8. A faithful assignment maps every formula ψ to a preorder ψ such that, for any w1, w2 W, it holds that: (f1) If w1, w2 [ψ], then w1 ψ w2 and w2 ψ w1; (f2) If w1 [ψ] and w2 / [ψ], then w1 <ψ w2; (f3) If ψ1 ψ2, then ψ1= ψ2. If ψ is a complete formula such that [ψ] = {w}, we abuse notation by writing w instead of ψ. Notice that in this case conditions f1 2 amount to simply saying that if w = w, then w